



EURORECAMP: An Alternative Model for EU Security Actorness

I. Introduction: 
Whereas the European Union (EU)​[1]​ has established itself as an economic and development assistance powerhouse, it remains less established as a security actor in the literature on EU external relations. The inability of the EU to deploy military capabilities independently without Member States’ consent is the main sticking point in EU attaining full security actorness in international affairs. Presently, common positions about military engagement depend on successful inter-governmental bargaining and negotiations among the 27 EU Member States, which is often a difficult process. Member States remain traditional in their view of ‘security issues’ and are reluctant to cede power to the supranational level about decision-making on national security, particular defence. 

Because the EU lacks independent military capabilities, some of the important literature on EU external relations contends that the EU is more or less impotent as an international actor or weak at best.​[2]​  This article contends that the ability of the EU to perform in international security does not necessarily depend on such full integration of Member States’ military capabilities. Rather, the article proposes that the successful performance of the EU in international security affairs relies on a division of labour between the Member States and EU institutions in Brussels. The article examines the development and implementation processes EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA​[3]​ as an example of such division of labour. This article begins by examining how the EU’s role in international affairs is constructed. Subsequently it examines an example of EU roles that transcends the typical approaches. Further, it examines the division of labour model that has emerged from the EURORECAMP example as evidence of a workable EU model for security engagement. The final section concludes with other lessons learnt within the process, which enhance and impede future EU actions specifically in African security and potentially in international security relations.

II. An Assessment of Typical Approaches to EU Roles in International Affairs
In responding to the claim that the `EU’s strength was its ability to act as a civilian power, i.e. wield its economic might, Bull suggests that to be recognised as a viable power in international affairs, economic power is not enough. Indeed the EU itself desires to be more than an economic power. The EU has systematically developed its foreign relations capabilities with tools like the inter-governmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and presently the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  Additionally, the EU has an increasing breadth of economic and development aid agreements with third countries, which incorporate elements of such as security sector reform. 

This indicates that the EU aspires to be more than just an economic power and understands that to be an actor in international affairs more is necessary. Admittedly, the use of these instruments, which also include the use of Member States military capabilities do not invalidate the EU’s economic or civilian power​[4]​ however retaining this label as the primary descriptor of the EU in international affairs is misleading in assessing what the EU does. 

Although civilian power Europe is insufficient for what the EU does, it has remained a tool of analysis for EU external relations actions. Rather than challenge the claim that the EU is less than an international security actor, proponents of the civilian power Europe concept have muddied the waters by ignoring the whole of EU actions​[5]​. Bull was therefore right in challenging the appropriateness of the concept of civilian power Europe and the idea that superior economic power would suffice for participation in international affairs. While the consensus may suggest that these instruments of external relations are yet to reach their highest potential, the actions undertaken using these instruments suggest that the EU is more than a civilian power in the sense that Duchêne​[6]​ meant. As indicated using examples of EU participation in peace support operations, we have come a long way from Bull’s claim that “Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one.” (EU Council, 2010)​[7]​. 

The reality of the EU’s role in international affairs has moved well beyond the boundaries of the notion of civilian power Europe. In addition to the availability of its foreign relations tools, the participation of the EU in peace support operation missions albeit in limited terms in places such as Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia among others places implore us to consider the actual extent of EU actorness in international affairs based on what it actually does. In light of these, the EU is at present a recognisable actor in international affairs and a security actor too. 

While we as EU scholars must strive to develop overarching concepts that account for the uniqueness of the EU in international security relations, the current discourse beyond civilian power Europe that asserts a different role for the EU in international relations is still lacking​[8]​. Indeed others have moved away from this dichotomy of the EU as either a civilian power, or a nonentity vis-à-vis international affairs; they take a more positive view of EU roles in external relations positing that the EU is a different sort of actor – a normative power. The main proponent of this view, Manners,​[9]​ suggests that determining EU roles, including security/peace roles requires looking beyond the traditional expectations including autonomous military capabilities. Rather, the role of the EU in international affairs stems from the normative elements of its international identity​[10]​. 

Manners identifies 9 norms, which the EU possesses, including peace.  Arguably, any means to influence or export peace in the international arena  is acceptable, good and counts towards EU participation in international security affairs despite the lack of the EU’s independent military capabilities. The concept of normative power in relation to Europe gives a holistic view of EU international actorness in many areas including sustainable peace (and security).  

The concept however, does not account for those areas where the EU engages in external relations to use its limited military capabilities (for logistical support, police action and especially training). Additionally, it does not capture the processes and conditions through which these limited capabilities are utilised. Therefore, while it is acceptable that the EU exports the peace norm to Africa, the normative power thesis does not help to explain the implications that various interactions with other partners such as the United Nations, the African regional organisations, and civil society, have on the international relations of the EU. The normative power thesis further makes a value judgement about the EU’s role in international affairs as being ‘good.’ While certainly an aspiration, it is not always consistent with EU actions in international affairs. Although normative power addresses the motivations of EU action and establishes the presence of the EU in the international arena, it leaves out the contextual processes of EU external relations, especially the perceptions of the external partners as recipients of EU actions in international affairs. 

As with civilian power, the normative power thesis inadequately explains those instances where the EU actively participates in international security without a common command structure and or accurately account for the ongoing timidity of the EU to participate in direct interventions. Ginsberg​[11]​ rightly suggests that rather than engaging solely with the normative debates or theoretical assertions about what the EU ought to be doing, or what it is incapable of doing, ‘real time’ participation is a better gauge of the extent of EU roles in international security affairs. Further, the extent of these roles depends on the perception of the action recipient. Hence, the extent of EU participation in international security relies on the partners of the EU including third countries and other regional institutions. Conceptual contributions to the study of EU roles in international affairs will benefit tremendously from such in-depth empirical accounts. These accounts elucidate the contexts and processes of international security relations beyond the challenges of EU decision-making and inevitable limitations. 

Having established that it is possible to assess successfully the EU’s participation in international security without an independent military, a good place to start such analysis is by examining recent EU-Africa relations pertaining to the establishment of international peace and security. 

III. EURORECAMP – AMANI AFRICA: EU Contributions to the Development of the ASF
The idea that regional security constitutes part of international security is not a new one. As a result, we ought to consider the responses to regional security as international security responses.​[12]​ As a result, the regional security challenges within Africa are part of the broader challenges of the international community. The perceived international consequences of regional security has been a key motivator for the international donor community of European and North American countries who are committed to supporting African peace and security initiatives. EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is a direct product of this consideration to support regional security in Africa. 

EURORECAMP is a process, which constitutes partnership and coordination among EU Member States and with the African Union (AU). It is a process steeped in past colonial relations and the institutionalised inter-regionalism, which commenced in 1957 between the EU and African states. This process of inter-regionalism was formalised first through the EU agreements with African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and more recently through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), a partnership between the EU and African States primarily the African Union. 

Through the various agreements, the European Union has built an enduring relationship with African states and institutions. This relationship has opened channels of political cooperation on peace and security. The selection of the EU as the choice partner for developing African security capabilities is therefore not coincidental. The impact of the previous relationship is evident in the development and implementation of the EURORECAMP process. 

EURORECAMP supports the African Standby Force (ASF) by providing a source of predictable funding (for training), knowledge or logistical expertise of peace support operations and a well-functioning institutional infrastructure. The ASF is one of the five components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union. It is to be composed of five regional brigades from North, South, East, West and Central African regions. In the initial two years of the EURORECAMP process (2008-2010), these brigades are undertaking training designed and funded by the EURORECAMP partners. Participants and observers expect that at the end of the two-year period, which ends in June 2010, a contingent of each brigade will be functional enough to participate in limited conflict management engagements within Africa.

According to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, the lack of these three provisions, “have [sic] an erosive effect on Africa’s ability to effectively resolve conflicts and prevent fresh ones.”​[13]​   Despite the AU’s comparative advantage in the African peace and security arena due to its personnel contributions, and its political legitimacy its lack of these provisions requires the institution to collaborate with the international donor community. It does this within frameworks such as EURORECAMP. Indeed, Article 17 of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council makes provisions for international cooperation to further the aims of the APSA  

The design of EURORECAMP is based on the French RECAMP programme, which transformed into a European inter-regional/multilateral project. In 1998, France launched the original concept, RECAMP (Reinforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix). RECAMP was France’s attempt to 'Africanise' the face of the peace support operations as most missions at the time were dominated by non-African peacekeepers. Through ‘Africanisation’ France introduced a new system of security and defence cooperation whereby African troops could respond to African security threats rather than rely on what was predominantly French intervention. Further, RECAMP however also sought to legitimise French security presence in Africa. Unlike the present EURORECAMP, France’s ‘Africanisation’ process lacked the concept of ownership whereby African were part of the decision-making process; the activities of RECAMP were planned in Paris and executed according to whatever was expedient for the French establishment. Presently however, EURORECAMP’s core stakeholders include the African Union with the European Union (including the EU Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and Member States) with the participation of other international actors.​[14]​ 
What has become EURORECAMP grew out of France’s desire to be on the forefront of security integration within the European Union while maintaining its privileged relationship with African countries. France began the process of Europeanising RECAMP as far back as 2002. The French government sought to adapt RECAMP to the African states’ requirements and introduced a continental dimension through dialogue with the African Union. It was aware of RECAMP’s weaknesses including its lack of integration with African sub-regional organisations, which at the time had the primary task of enforcing peace on the continent. During the initial changes, France included the participation of international organisations, including the UN and EU and non-governmental organisations as observers and advisors. By 2005 former French president Jacques Chirac formally announced the desire to include RECAMP in the ESDP framework as the ‘operator of reference’ for other EU Member States’ programmes. The reorganisation of RECAMP in 2005 reflects the willingness of the French government to make the process more adaptable to a continental approach whereby the beneficiary was Africa as a whole.  Further, the resulting EURORECAMP is indicative of internal transformation within the French establishment to change France’s relationship with Africa and emphasise multilateralism and partnership in foreign policy engagement​[15]​.
Despite its French origins, EURORECAMP is a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) initiative implemented in accordance with the provisions of the European Security Strategy, and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) of December 2007, adopted at the Lisbon Summit (EU Council Secretariat, 2009).​[16]​ EURORECAMP is a direct result of the second Action Plan (AP) within the peace and security cluster of the JAES. The Action Plan commits the EU to supporting the APSA by building its capacities to prevent, manage and resolve conflict as well as engage in post-conflict reconstruction. The peace and security cluster of the JAES aims 

“To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedom, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa.” (JAES, 2007)
The process, which created EURORECAMP, also relied on developments in other EU Member States especially in the UK and in Germany. In the U.K., former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, declared 2005 as the ‘year of Africa’. Following the publication of the report, Our Common Interest, by the Commission for Africa (COA), Africa became a focal point for debate within the U.K. among development and security practitioners. The report emphasised the need for development agencies to work with the African Union in particular. It also made the crucial link between development and security emphasising that countries that showed successful development were less likely to succumb to violent conflicts.​[17]​ 
Mr Blair played a crucial role in promoting the panel’s report to other EU Member States through inter-governmental networks, EU institutions and the G8 grouping. Following in the footsteps of the U.K., Germany announced its own programme, Partnership with Africa​[18]​. Established in 2005, Horst Kohler, the German president at that time announced the programme. Germany conceived of the partnership as part of its broader development strategy although it included support for the African Union and its peace and security objectives. Germany is unique in that while it uses its European heritage to promote its partnership with Africa, until the eventual formation of EURORECAMP, it relied more on the G8 mechanism rather than the EU institutions. 
Nevertheless, the prioritisation of Africa’s peace and security by the Big 3 (France, UK and Germany) fed into the supranational psyche, which culminated in the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa by the EU Council in 2005. It argued for better and broader coordination within Europe for political and security cooperation with African institutions especially the continental and sub-regional organisation which represent the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).At the supranational level, the EU begun to strengthen its ability to participate in the fields of foreign security and conflict prevention as a single entity.​[19]​ Although the Member States had different views about what developed European capabilities would look like, it was nevertheless an aspiration of the EU to be an international security actor. These developments were motivated by changes at the international level which. These developments called for the international donor community to take action on African security concerns. 
At the EU national levels the debates among EU Member States and within the EU bureaucracy was about what form security action and policies in Africa would take have also contributed to developments that contribute to the EU’s security stature.​[20]​ The negotiation of the EU-ACP Agreement of 2000 (the Cotonou Agreement) was the first clear indication that EU intended to pursue policies within the area of security, for example conflict prevention and non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The European Commission advocated strongly for this inclusion although presenting it as a development issue rather than a security one.​[21]​ In 2004, the EU Peace and Security Committee (EU PSC) adopted the ESDP Action Plan for Africa.​[22]​ The Action Plan outlined practical recommendations that would later contribute to the establishment of an EU delegation to the AU, which included sending liaison officers to Addis Ababa and providing expert training in political affairs and peace and security.
EURORECAMP relies on the context of the existing relationships between the EU and Africa including the longstanding relationship between France and the UK, and their relationships with their former colonies. In the 1990s when France launched its RECAMP programme, the UK too launched the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme. The U.K. had lacked the security presence that France had in Africa during the Cold War period. Indeed, the UK was mostly invisible from the security landscape of the African continent until 2000 when it intervened in the civil war in Sierra Leone. This has often been characterised as the UK’s lack of interest in Africa. Yet, the UK supported the enhancement of the peace support capabilities of African troops. The UK provided training to sub-regional organisations’ peace support missions as well as individual African countries.​[23]​ In many cases, the intention of providing training for African peacekeepers was in preparing them for being part of the multinational UN peacekeeping force. 
Despite the different contexts of engagement in Africa, there were enough similarities between the French and British initiatives making cooperation appealing to both countries. In 1998, the UK, France and the United States established the P3 initiative consisting of the RECAMP, the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme and the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The purpose of the joint initiative was to engage in “a more focused and systematic approach to the implementation” of training for peace support operations for Africans. This division of labour model has inspired the current EURORECAMP process. Without a hierarchical order, each of the three initiatives formed a component of the whole, without infringing on the perceived territories of the others while maximising resources and expediting training for many African countries.

EURORECAMP, unlike previous programmes, emphasises a broader outlook on security and so includes the training of military, police and civilian forces. The resulting African Standby Force (ASF) expects to have capabilities to deal with conflict prevention, management, resolutions and some capacity for assisting with post-conflict reconstruction. EURORECAMP therefore embraces the spirit of the European Security Strategy (ESS), which advocates a holistic approach to security. This framework of the EURORECAMP allows the EU to sidestep its lack of independent military capabilities. Given various contributions from France and Britain (and other partners), EURORECAMP goes beyond the simple Europeanisation of the French RECAMP. It is a new tool, which retains the education and training component of the French RECAMP. Figure 1 below illustrates the transformation.

Figure 1: Transformation of bi-lateral to inter-regional/multilateral

Source: EURORECAMP Presentation, 2007​[24]​

The role of the African Union as co-owner of the EURORECAMP process further contributes to the ‘newness’ of European programmes for capacity building in Africa. The EURORECAMP process as it currently exists cannot exist without the partnership with African states and institutions. As part of the conditions of the cooperation with the EU, the AU made three central demands. First, African states insisted on partnership with the AU rather than African states or sub-regional organisations. With the AU being the main coordination counterpart to the EU in Africa, the process can be truly inter-regional. This allowed the AU to assert its authority in the area of peace and security. Second, the AU requested for the process and product to be owned by Africans. So rather than directly training African armed forces, the European partners’ responsibility is to train the trainers, who then use the knowledge gained in their local context to help their troops prepare for multidimensional peace support operations. Third, it was important for the EU rather than France to lead the European side of the partnership. This was necessary because according to sources in the EU and Africa the history of colonialism lingers when negotiating issues of peace and security. 

The intent of co-ownership represents a fundamental difference from previous EU-Africa relations and other European capacity building programmes but continuity in that it reinforces inter-regionalism between the EU and Africa. Whereas, the institutionalisation of EU-Africa relations is a process occurring over 50+ years, they had more or less emphasised a relationship of acute asymmetry – a donor-recipient relationship. However, the structure and practice enshrined in the JAES as well as changes within European and African establishments has contributed to a transformation in that relationship and the implementation of the EURORECAMP is a tangible example of this. This is not to assert that the relationship between the EU and AU is equal.  
European Union Member States offer military and civilian peacekeeping training for senior African military and civilian personnel at their national training centres in Italy, France, and Hungary among others locations in Europe.​[25]​The preferences of each contributing Member States determine their duties within the process. In addition, the EU Member States are responsible for funding training at African training centres like the Kofi Annan Training International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), the Ghanaian Staff and Command College and the Kenyan Staff College and Peace Support Training Centre, which support the training of components of the ASF brigades by the senior personnel members.
In theory, AU and EU personnel lead the day-to-day process of EURORECAMP. The EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa represents the work of the EU, while Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union represents the AU’s counterparts. However, the EU takes on a substantial amount of the operational responsibilities because it has better institutional capabilities than the African Union. Consequently, the EU Commission and General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) work together to assist the EU Member States with the implementation of the EURORECAMP process. Staff from the EU Commission and GSC in addition to the EURORECAMP headquarter staff are charged with conveying African viewpoints to the EU Member States and liaising daily with their African counterparts. Additionally, the EU Commission External Relations organs (DG RELEX and DG Development) contribute to the budget of EURORECAMP in a variety of ways. The Commission sponsors the African Peace Facility recently negotiated €300 million as part of the 10th European Development Fund (2008-2010) including €20 million earmarked for capability building. A trust fund managed by the framework nation, France accommodates these funds. 
In addition to the role of the EU institutions and the EU Member States, the mission to achieve a functional Standby Force through EURORECAMP has involved a strong tripartite alliance of EU-UN-AU. The UN has contributed a seconded team of six personnel from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The UN’s involvement is obvious to the extent that the AU’s peace operations are part of the broader response to international security threats. Regional organisations could potentially play the role of agents of international peace and security within their spheres of influence. These roles, it has been argued would make up for the deficiencies in the UN’s peacekeeping system and it is supported by Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. 

The prominent role of the UN does not discount other non-European actors in the EURORECAMP; rather it has encouraged their participation. Indeed one of the main accomplishments of the EU institutions including the Commission, and the General Secretariat of the Council has been to woo other non-EU countries and organisations such as NATO to contribute to the EURORECAMP process. Countries such as Canada, Norway and Japan are some of such countries while NATO provides non-monetary resources that contribute to capability building for the ASF. 

At the Canadian Summit of 2002 for instance, the Group of 8 leading industrial nations, G8 (with the EU represented), adopted the G8 African Action Plan which pledged support for African efforts to ensure lasting peace and security. The action plan guaranteed the AU 

“financial and technical assistance so that, by 2010, African countries and regional and sub-regional organisations (sic) are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter” (G8 Action Plan, 2002: 4).
After the creation of the AU, African states initiated discussions with international donors about supporting the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF). Subsequently, the AU made a formal request to the G8 at the 2003 Evian Summit to ask for assistance to defray the costs of building the ASF. This first overture was unique in that the African Union rather than one individual African state made it. This reflected the African states’ commitment to regionalism through security cooperation. With the active lobbying of France, Germany the United Kingdom (with the eventual support of the United States) and the EU representation, particularly the EU Commission, the G8 countries pledged their support for the AU initiative and committed to the “continuation of funding, training and enhanced co-ordination of activities.”​[26]​  Members of the G8 welcomed the prospect of engaging in African security in this manner, bearing in mind that by 2003 the US and some of the EU Member States​[27]​ with historically privileged positions in Africa’s international relations had a growing concern about China’s new position as an international donor in Africa.
The outcome of these initial dialogues with the G8 was the Joint Africa/G8 Action Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to undertake Peace Support Operations (2003). In response, the G8 called for a more gradual approach to the implementation of the ASF by identifying key “building blocks” which targeted the specific aims of building African capabilities to launch peace support operations​[28]​  The Action Plan sets out the precise aims of the partnership and emphasises African ownership of the process. Further, it acknowledges other ongoing training programmes undertaken by the G8 in the assumption that these would be components of the G8-Africa partnership.
Despite the participation of other donor partners, the EU, including the Member States and the EU Commission have contributed the most to the process. EURORECAMP is integral to the development of Africa’s ability to deal with security threats on the continent and this cannot be understated. “The EU has the means, willingness and experience the AU needs to develop its structures” and through EURORECAMP it uses these.​[29]​ The broader contribution of the EURORECAMP is to the creation of a viable African Peace and Security Architecture, which is to maintain regional peace and security. Because regional security contributes to international security, EURORECAMP is therefore a contributory tool to international security. 

This article has so far developed the argument that the partnership between the EU and Africa through EURORECAMP is a positive alliance for international peace and security. Further, EURORECAMP is an innovative way for EU participation in international security affairs because it is able to evade the requirement of security actorness based on independent military capability. This requirement, which is undoubtedly useful to EU’s credibility as a security actor, remains elusive because Member States are unwilling to devolve certain powers to Brussels, yet as seen with EURORECAMP, this does not prevent active participation in international security rather it confirms participation in a different way through a division of labour. 

IV. Challenges to EURORECAMP
Despite its success, as an alliance for international security and peace, the process of EURORECAMP has had its challenges (EC, 2009)​[30]​. It would be remise not to question whether EURORECAMP as a capability-building project responds adequately to the immediate threats of violence in Africa. This is a valid concern especially since the full operationalisation of the ASF will take time and the peace and security challenges are happening now. Indeed, there is the question of the compatibility of this inter-regional security project with other international security engagements of the EU member states, which contribute directly or indirectly, to insecurity in Africa. However, given that EURORECAMP is a self contain programme designed specifically to validate the ASF it is not useful to use it as an assessment tool for other EU actions in Africa.

The process of creating a multidimensional force is also quite difficult as the institutional cultures of the military and civilian have been difficult to reconcile. There have been concerns that the military components of the ASF have developed more rapidly than the civilian components within EURORECAMP. These civilian components, which aimed at tackling humanitarian and post conflict reconstruction, are crucial for lasting peace on the continent and therefore the stagnation of their development is a problem. Despite this concern, many of the brigades that constitute the ASF have performed quite well in their training exercises. The frequent meeting of the stakeholders in EURORECAMP identified the problems earlier in the process and the concerted effort to mitigate its impact on the process has so far been successful. However, the importance of civilian aspects of the ASF ought to be constantly on the forefront of future partnerships because the tendency is to prioritise the military components of peacekeeping forces.

Further to the above two challenges, a prevailing challenge during the EURORECAMP process has been the problem ‘ownership’. Built into the design of EURORECAMP whereby the EU and the AU are equal partners is the idea that Africans would locally own the process. However, participants have raised concerns about the extent to which this has been the case. This is a valid concern. The African side of the partnership is having trouble integrating the concerns of national and sub-regional actors and institutions into the African Union apparatus and this is an ongoing concern across all areas of African Peace and Security Architecture. This situation therefore raises questions about the extent to which the Regional Economic Communities, the bedrock, of the APSA actively participate in the process. To mitigate this, the EU is funding integration programmes through the monetary and logistical support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and Regional Integration for Development in ACP Countries (EU Commission, 2008)​[31]​. These challenges are ongoing, and tackling them will take time. However, awareness means they are constantly on the forefront of both the EU and AU’s agenda.

V. Lessons Learnt: Division of Labour as a Model for EU in International Security Affairs
The implementation of EURORECAMP involves a division of labour among EU Member States. The usefulness of division of labour has dogged the organisation of international security and the external relations of the EU as well, usually within the context of development. Within the development sphere, the EU promotes the organisation of poverty reduction strategies in third countries through a division of labour and complementarity model, which targets the international donors to achieve aid effectiveness.

Recently, the idea of division of labour in international security has arisen with respect to shared burdens between the EU and NATO and especially​[32]​.  The growing consensus within the EU and NATO is that both institutions would benefit from coordination based on individual strengths; i.e. the EU’s strength in civilian-military security and NATO’s strength in defence. Currently however, the lack of political will remains a bureaucratic challenge for this sort of coordination.​[33]​Each institution struggles for its own continued relevance in an age where the understanding of security is evolving.  

The benefits of a division of labour in international security are evident in the EURORECAMP, which has used the network of resources that consists of the EU, UN, NATO, G8, AU and the African RECs. This coordination has ensured that there is no duplication among the international donors, that the relevant international institutions work together for the goal of peace and building the institutions for peace in Africa does not overburden a particular institution. Additionally, the process of EURORECAMP has fostered close relations between the international donors through shared knowledge concerning African peace and security.

I suggest that the same principle of a division of labour between Member States is applicable to the internal organisation of EU participation in international security as evidenced by the EURORECAMP. By organising its contribution to security through a division of labour among Member States and EU institutions, the EU bypasses its lack of an autonomous military outfit and contributes in a positive way to international security. EURORECAMP reinforces the notion that Member States have the primary responsibility of decision-making. Yet, collective action is possible by working through a formula that ensures that no one Member State is more relevant. 

EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA reflects a unique case of cooperation on security among EU Member States, which relies on new understandings of international security. The process of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has been a long time coming.  The creation and function of the process has transformed internal EU dynamics as well as cooperation dynamics between the EU and Africa. The central lesson of a process like EURORECAMP is the ability of the EU to use its military and civilian capabilities outside an autonomous structure. Indeed, the success of EURORECAMP as a cooperation endeavour for the EU is ascribed to the division of labour model utilised by the Member States and EU institutions. 

The process also represents a distinct embrace of inter-regionalism (and arguably multilateralism) in lieu of bi-lateral relations. Through the sheer number and types of participants involved in the design and implementation of EURORECAMP, it would be remise not to consider its consequences for the European Security Strategy to promote effective multilateralism. This article shows that the EU is capable of promoting multilateral engagement in international security and EURORECAMP is a discernible example of its success. The knowledge of the EURORECAMP process presented in this article is indicative of the types of roles the EU plays in the international security arena. 

Multilateralism as it pertains to the EU deserves a two-fold examination. First is a brief examination of its conceptual meaning. The second part evaluates the extent to which EURORECAMP contributes to the EU’s quest for effective multilateralism. As a concept, multilateralism is less developed in international relations than other concepts.​[34]​ Yet, the few works dedicated to multilateralism have defined the concept in a variety of ways.​[35]​ In assessing these scholarly contributions, one can conclude that the concept of multilateralism is both a principle and a process of cooperation among actors in international relations. Hence, multilateralism is both a goal of EU external security relations and a means of pursuing such relations.

As previously described, EURORECAMP involves other actors outside of the EU institutions and Member States including other institutions such as NATO and the G8, and individual countries such as the United States and Canada. The arrangement pursued by EURORECAMP is exemplary of the EU goal and process of multilateralism. Importantly, the arrangement also involves the participation of the ultimate multilateral institution, the United Nations through the active engagement of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the design and implementation of the current EURORECAMP exercises. Evidently, the African Union also pressed for the contribution of other international donors by lobbying the G8. Ultimately, however, it was through the UK, France and Germany that convinced donors like the United States to subscribe to the EURORECAMP process. Getting the United States on board within the inter-regional framework was especially important especially since some African states had previously rejected US initiatives​[36]​. 

Within the broader framework of EU-Africa relations, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA constitutes a change in how EU Member States relate to African Member States on matters of security. The EU and AU have forged an exclusive instance of cooperation that champions partnership in security without necessarily compromising the jealous hold of the nation state in this arena. Indeed, the arrangement of the EURORECAMP perhaps confirms the continued primacy of EU Member States’ roles in international security.
  
EURORECAMP further reveals the evolved methods of implementation within the intergovernmental structure of external relations of the EU. Contrary to reports about the EU’s ineffectiveness in the area of security due to its lack of a single foreign policy, EURORECAMP reflects a unique role of the EU as a different type of contributor within the international security architecture. When applying the division of labour model created in the EU Toolkit for better aid effectiveness​[37]​, to the EURORECAMP framework, France played the role of the lead donor (to a certain extent with the UK) while the other Member States and the European Commission played active donor roles. NATO is a delegating (or background/silent) donor. 

Evidently, the EU Member States can cooperate as one entity without ceding their decision-making powers to Brussels. Cooperation amongst EU member states in this instance favoured a division of labour model rather than a pooled system of decision-making. Division of labour is a well-known economic model whereby different actors who specialise in their task areas share a work process. In the case of the EU, this allows for non-competitive engagement in areas of international security while minimising duplication among EU Member States and their partners. One of the reasons that cooperation among EU member states has worked is because each country involved in the process formed a component of the initiative; so rather than a complete centralisation of the training process, the involved countries sought ways in which to coordinate in accordance with their perceived national interest and with full decision-making powers. This allowed each country to maintain their privileged position within Africa. Further, it eliminated duplication and no one programme superseded another. This formula would become important for EURORECAMP, as EU Member States still jealously guard their sovereignty on matters of security. The ability of each partner to own a component of the EURORECAMP was one of the reasons why the EU Member States agreed to cooperate with each other. EURORECAMP therefore allows better coordination among EU Member States. This is especially important within EU-Africa relations because African institutions lack the capabilities to sift through donor contributions. In a case such as EURORECAMP where the EU has organised the donors, the daily travails of cooperation between the EU and Africa work better. 

In addition to broadening interregional cooperation, EURORECAMP has deepened interregional cooperation as implementation methods call for an in-depth knowledge of countries and regions in Africa as well the bureaucratic arrangements of EU Member States. EURORECAMP has also increased the EU’s commitment to Africa. To this end, the EU has a delegation dedicated to the AU.  Additionally, EURORECAMP has allowed for the broader participation of EU countries such as Finland and Denmark whose engagement with African countries had been limited to its external development policies in a handful of countries.​[38]​ In all, through engagement with Africa on matters of peace and security, the EU institutions and Member States have been core components of EURORECAMP a multilateral endeavour whose contribution and successes has depended on a division of labour among EU Member States.

VI. Conclusion
The division of labour model ought to be championed by small and big EU Member States. It creates the opportunity for smaller EU Member States and the European Commission to participate fully in international relations security. Further, it makes decision-making process on security less cumbersome for EU Member States with prior interest on a specific issue or region. Additionally, the EU is able to achieve a more effective foreign policy with its partners when there is a clear strategy on a particular security policy issue. If Member States adopt division of labour as a strategy, the EU has the potential to undertake more security engagements in the international system.
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